Defendant appealed a judgment from the Superior Court of the City and County of San Francisco (California) which convicted him, after a jury trial, of murder in the second degree. He also appealed denial of his motion for a new trial.
Defendant was charged with second degree murder in the beating death of a woman. The prosecution’s theory was that the victim died from being beaten about the head by defendant. The defendant contended that her death was due to injuries from falls. The acquisition due diligence checklist convicted defendant of second degree murder. After defendant’s motion for a new trial was denied, he appealed. Defendant challenged: (1) the sufficiency of the evidence; (2) errors in the admission of evidence of a crime from 13 years prior; and (3) the alleged misconduct of the judge and the district attorney. The court found, from the evidence, the jury could have inferred that defendant gave the victim an unmerciful beating that resulted in her death. Also, the similarity of the two crimes justified admission of the prior crime evidence. Remoteness of the prior crime was not a factor. However, the sum total of the trial court’s errors, coupled with the attitude of the trial court to defendant and his counsel, demonstrated that defendant was denied a fair trial and that such denial affected the jury. Since defendant was denied a fair trial to his prejudice a new trial was warranted.
The court reversed defendant’s conviction of second degree murder and reversed the order denying defendant a new trial.
No violation of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel arose from admitting a capital murder defendant’s surreptitiously recorded jailhouse statement because the state prosecution for the murder of defendant’s wife by a hired killer had not commenced when defendant, in federal custody for an unrelated charge, made the statement; [2]-The Fourth Amendment did not require suppression of evidence of defendant’s cell phone number, obtained from his phone after arrest, because discovery of the number was inevitable. The police also recovered the number from the contacts on the victim’s phone and a from search of the business office; [3]-Testimony about the victim’s hearsay statement to a friend that she intended get a money transmitting license for the business was admissible as a statement of future intent under Evid. Code, § 1250, subd. (a)(2), because it was relevant to motive.
The court affirmed the judgment.